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in reply to Mastodon.social Staff

We're as frustrated as everyone else with these phishing attacks. mastodon.social had new sign-ups in approval mode this week to limit the impact, but offenders targeted other instances and compromised existing accounts. We take the problem very seriously; we're suspending and blocking as quickly as possible, as well as actively working on countermeasures.
in reply to Mastodon.social Staff

I wish you could force new accounts in limited mode. So folks could sign up but would signups need approval to start messaging others.
This entry was edited (5 months ago)
in reply to Stefan

@stefan Oh thats a nice one!

Or maaaybe some sort of REGEX filter on signup? Since they seem to use a pattern maybe

in reply to Mastodon.social Staff

Some general support for opt-in blocklisting (where servers and individuals can subscribe to sources they they trust for blocking rules) would be invaluable for Mastodon in general.
This entry was edited (5 months ago)
in reply to Martin Dougiamas

@martin that wouldn't really help in this case because spammers don't tend to slow-feed misuse/abuse, instead they flood, so by the time the account ends up on a blocklist it's either already suspended by origin server, or the attackers have moved on to other accounts after encountering rate limits.
in reply to Emelia ๐Ÿ‘ธ๐Ÿป

@thisismissem Assuming the admin of that server is vigilant (but I donโ€™t think thatโ€™s always the case). There could also be regexp rules for the text as well (which would catch any account it came from) etc
in reply to Martin Dougiamas

@martin so the spam waves we're seeing are quite advanced and adaptive, it's not like the script kiddie spam from last year.

With this spam wave, I'm still analyzing the data, but:
- we've seen at least 13 different domains used for the phishing site
- we've seen them using CWs when spamming publicly
- we've seen them use multiple different scripts (what's written), including multiple languages

Regexp and publicly available lists of data are not something that would particularly help, as as soon as you publish & block keywords or domains, the attack changes.

If a server admin is not vigilant, then they should not have open registration (ex. Mastodon.social), but there's servers out there that are several versions out of date, so they don't get any of the new mitigation features or warnings (there's a big warning about open registration in the admin panel since 4.3.x)

in reply to Emelia ๐Ÿ‘ธ๐Ÿป

@staff

would limiting rate of posts for new accounts help?

so you make a new account, you only get 3 posts on your first day for example

but... they'll just register and go dormant for a period of time

no, you could still do it:

rate limit number of first few posts, no matter account age

so... they post innocuous garbage to get past that hurdle

but that's still useful

put up these kinds of barriers to make spamming hard, while not interfering with regular users

This entry was edited (4 months ago)
in reply to Cainmark Does Not Comply ๐Ÿšฒ

@cainmark @nunesgh We have the staff role badge which can only be set by the server administrator, though the badge is only visible when you are viewing it from mastodon.social itself.
in reply to Mastodon.social Staff

@cainmark
Thank you for that information! I'm on mastodon.social, but I'm usually on a third-party app, #Fedilab, which doesn't show badges, so domain verification is still important.
On that, why not verify through mastodon.social and mastodon.online instead of joinmastodon.org?

#Mastodon #MastodonSocial #MastodonOnline

in reply to Gabriel H. Nunes

@nunesgh
At least, when opening the profil remotely, you should see the badge with Fedilab. So there is an issue on our end. Bookmarked for a fix.
@staff @cainmark
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