Friendica
  • Sign in
LPS
LPS

LPS

lps@social.trom.tf

LPS

lps@social.trom.tf
Follow
Atom feed
Network posts
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA0tivm4StVLrVoT66sUQX 6MIEngBxdH59GdQUXJkDwkpZdkVBMk/6BFN/2kzWjciEwbD/hOezXLaNjrU9ssbb 8TU1mkmBrMVY9KfFJGGttodu7KUtPnxz4jlm9gg6q9wVyM9ld0IJxmCzuNdAB9i/ CKbqU2dMHaRLoXLU4zMMN+S76ezS2TjdlsSS2H9hZk4cgz+dVVTOjIQKHM876/AX BthpvdmxurHp4N+sPmqmaqyoyAGPjwzLGF1hlOGjmAJr1QwAmXD5V85fJNGcfWS5 9rtaFLgPuZzoI7aWuIzrD5NRZKNlQjRmI4BdJ2OyMUwo4Sew+CYsfmYI7d19nscV x3gxzq1EcWwYQY69ay17eDnVRnlTkt0EYSbxAEIjnJfrNHXXMfIoESEV6E54aJl0 sYTA7e/w5IPTJjxiAJU7R7W7F2X0iVFJ3uZyD/Si8m+QZ2TKOtKfBJuyoP8J878D SJyR+/nAdBKajLDW/tozlcMu3mzNkHqQPTxvf5hnlbywfNQaSG28DE++Y8p2TEvb GCsbimF6mJgMjov71VgmdK5EPQvKO86cGUDotO7K4eIcbBm0dzxLRsshFVNNAJcL pnvfr67jVrjc25vm01w+c5y+eMZDvXKXToOnqlyMz19T+o3Ai9LlrSWKoL/aSPI+ /KGiyf0yoal72QR6xR8GENcCAwEAAQ== -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
2025-01-06T12:11:53+00:00
Uid
dbc8dc44-6160-407e-fcd3-164859814365
Nickname
lps
Full_name
LPS
Searchable
true
First_name
LPS
Family_name
Url
https://social.trom.tf/
Photo
Photo_medium
Photo_small
2022-05-06 12:25:15 2022-05-06 12:25:14 2022-05-06 12:25:14 4642838

LPS
LPS
friendica (DFRN) - Link to source

LPS

3 years ago from DiCa •

LPS

3 years ago from DiCa •


Kristina Panos

Fri May 06 11:00:34 +0000 2022


Despite their claims of innocence, we all know that the

... Show more...

Kristina Panos

Fri May 06 11:00:34 +0000 2022


Despite their claims of innocence, we all know that the big tech firms are listening to us. How else to explain the sudden appearance of ads related to something we’ve only ever spoken about, seemingly in private but always in range of a phone or smart speaker? And don’t give us any of that fancy “confirmation bias” talk — we all know what’s going on.
And now, to make matters worse, it turns out that just listening to your keyboard clicks could be enough to decode what’s being typed. To be clear, (Georgi Gerganov)’s “KeyTap3” exploit does not use any of the usual RF-based methods we’ve seen for exfiltrating data from keyboards on air-gapped machines. Rather, it uses just a standard microphone to capture audio while typing, building a cluster map of the clicks with similar sounds. By analyzing the clusters against the statistical likelihood of certain sequences of characters appearing together — the algorithm currently assumes standard English, and works best on clicky mechanical keyboards — a reasonable approximation of the original keypresses can be reconstructed.
If you’d like to see it in action, check out the video below, which shows the algorithm doing a pretty good job decoding text typed on an unplugged keyboard. Or, try it yourself — the link above implements KeyTap3 in-browser. We gave it a shot, but as a member of the non-mechanical keyboard underclass, it couldn’t make sense of the mushy sounds it heard. Then again, our keyboard inferiority affords us some level of protection from the exploit, so there’s that.

What strikes us about this is that it would be super simple to deploy an exploit like this. Most side-channel attacks require such a contrived scenario for installing the exploit that just breaking in and stealing the computer would be easier. All KeyTap needs is a covert audio recording, and the deed is done.
www.youtube.com/embed/5aphvxpS… Audio Eavesdropping Exploit Might Make That Clicky Keyboard Less CoolreallyEditors Note: Just tried it on a mechanical keyboard with Cherry MX Blue switches and it couldn’t make heads or tails of what was typed, so your mileage may vary. Let us know if it worked for you in the comments.Editors Note

  •  Detected languages
  •  Raw content
  •  Share via ...
⇧